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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TIFFANY CURTIS, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
SANTIAGO STEVEN MAESE, 
Respondent and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 20090454-CA 
Petitioner and Appellee, Tiffany Curtis, by and through her attorney, Rebecca 
Hyde Skordas, submits the following Brief of Appellee. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-3a-101, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9), Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 33, and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 74(c) are included in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner and Appellee Tiffany Curtis obtained a civil stalking order against 
Respondent and Appellant Steven Maese. The court below proceeded to the stalking 
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injunction hearing over Mr. Maese's motion to continue the hearing. The court explained 
to Mr. Maese the numerous reasons that supported denial of the continuance. On appeal 
Mr. Maese argues he was entitled to a continuance so he could find substitute counsel and 
present witnesses on his behalf. The court below did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Mr. Maese's motion for a continuance. In addition, Mr. Maese was not entitled to 
counsel at the hearing and the court did not violate Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Criminal Cases 
Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis began dating in 2005 and became partners in an escort 
agency known as "The Doll House." R. 284. On October 4, 2006, the State charged Mr. 
Maese with Racketeering, Exploiting a Prostitute, and Money Laundering. R. 286. (Case 
no. 061906590.) On the same day, the State filed a separate Information charging Ms. 
Curtis with the same offenses. Id (Case no. 061906589.) In both cases the State alleged 
that the escort agency was merely a guise under which Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis 
operated a prostitution ring. 
During the course of their criminal cases, Ms. Curtis broke all ties with Mr. 
Maese. When Mr. Maese discovered she was considering a plea deal and considering 
testifying against him at his jury trial, Mr. Maese became increasingly hostile toward her. 
In August 2007, Mr. Maese told Ms. Curtis: "I own you. I have no problem living with a 
scorched-earth mentality. I will take you down." R. 285. Ms. Curtis pled guilty to two 
counts of Attempted Exploitation of a Prostitute, class A misdemeanors, and was 
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sentenced to probation. While Mr. Maese's case was pending, he hired a private 
investigator to follow Ms. Curtis and document any possible probation violations so that 
he could harass and attempt to impeach her if she testified. R.331 A: 26-27. 
Prior to Mr. Maese's trial, the State charged Mr. Maese with Witness Tampering, 
a third degree felony, and Stalking, a class A misdemeanor on April 24, 2008. (Case no. 
081903234.) The State alleged that on April 17, 2008, Mr. Maese followed Ms. Curtis 
from the freeway to her destination. When she entered the business, he drove past the 
door looking for her inside and then circled her empty car twice before leaving. R.331 A: 
21. The State also alleged that on April 21, 2008, Mr. Maese followed Ms. Curtis on the 
freeway and circled her moving vehicle three times. R.331 A: 22. The State alleged that 
in each of these three circles Mr. Maese drove behind Ms. Curtis, changed lanes to her 
driver's side, passed her, cut her off, then changed lanes to her right, and let her pass him. 
14 
Ms. Curtis testified against Mr. Maese at his trial on July 10, 2008. The jury 
convicted him of one count of Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a second degree felony, and 
four counts of Exploiting a Prostitute, all third degree felonies. On January 26, 2009, Mr. 
Maese was sentenced to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison, which was suspended, and he 
was ordered to 60 days in jail. As a condition of his probation, Mr. Maese was ordered to 
have no contact with Ms. Curtis. R.331A: 1 (19-21). Mr. Maese is currently appealing 
that case. 
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On May 4, 2009, Mr. Maese pled guilty to two counts of Acting as a Private 
Investigator Without a License, both class B misdemeanors, for following Ms. Curtis in 
her vehicle while his case was pending. He was placed on probation for one year. 
The Civil Stalking Injunction 
On September 16, 2008, Ms. Curtis requested the civil stalking injunction in this 
case based on the same conduct for which Mr. Maese was prosecuted criminally. On 
October 27, 2008, Mr. Maese was served with the injunction and a stalking injunction 
hearing was scheduled for December 3, 2008. The stalking injunction hearing was 
continued at counsel's request. The hearing was rescheduled for December 10, 2008. 
On December 3, 2008, Mr. Maese filed a pro se Hearing Memorandum that was 
19 pages long and included a detailed Table of Authorities and citations in proper 
bluebook style. Mr. Maese subpoenaed Ms. Curtis's email records, which Ms. Curtis 
moved to quash. On December 8, 2009, Mr. Maese retained an attorney, Mr. Gilbert 
Athay. 
The stalking injunction hearing was again continued, at the stipulation of counsel. 
The evidentiary hearing was scheduled for January 13, 2009; however, it was also 
rescheduled based on the stipulation of counsel based on Mr. Maese's concerns about 
Fifth Amendment issues as his stalking trial was scheduled for February 19, 2009. R. 
349:4(8-10). 
On January 20, 2009, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on Ms. Curtis's 
Motion to Quash the Subpoena. The Court ordered the emails 1o be turned over to Ms. 
Curtis's attorney, Rebecca Hyde Skordas, for her review and then ordered that she send 
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them to Mr. Athay. Later Mr. Maese alleged he had never seen the emails. R. 331 A: 6 
(1-2). Ms. Skordas informed the court that she requested a copy of the subpoena from Mr. 
Athay after the court's order because she had never seen it and did not otherwise know its 
scope. R. 331 A: 5-6. Mr. Athay failed to produce the subpoena. Id. Ms. Skordas 
informed the court that the same subpoena had been issued in Mr. Maese's criminal case 
so she assumed Mr. Maese would have had the information pursuant to that request. R. 
331A:6(8-10). 
The Civil Stalking Injunction Hearing 
On March 6, 2009, approximately six months after the ex parte stalking order was 
signed, the court held the civil stalking injunction hearing. Mr. Maese, who was 
incarcerated, was present with his attorney; however, his counsel moved to withdraw 
because he did not feel comfortable making motions demanded by Mr. Maese. R. 331 A: 
3 (20-21). Mr. Athay stated that he and Mr. Maese had "had some discussions in that 
regard" and that the "lawyer/client relationship in this case does not currently exist." R. 
331 A: 4 (2-5). Mr. Maese agreed with Mr. Athay and asked that he "be relieved as my 
counsel in this matter just - and even a week or two weeks continuance is all that would 
be required on this." Id. at (9-10). Mr. Athay stated that he had spoken to other counsel 
with whom Mr. Maese had also contacted. Id. at (11-12). Mr. Athay represented that 
there had been communication between Mr. Maese and another lawyer but he understood 
that the other lawyer had not been retained. Id. at (14-16). 
Ms. Skordas objected to the continuance, stating that she had already agreed to the 
prior continuance requested by Mr. Athay to preserve Mr. Maese's Fifth Amendment 
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rights in his upcoming criminal jury trial. Id, at (19-25). Despite this concession, Mr. 
Maese also continued the jury trial in the criminal stalking case until May 13, 2009, 
shortly after obtaining the continuance in this case. Mr. Maese argued that he was 
entitled to a continuance because Mr. Athay refused to move for a continuance even 
though he did not receive Ms. Curtis's emails. 
The Court stated: 
"Well, we're going to move forward. You can relieve Mr. Athay if you wish, but 
we're going forward today. I mean, this isn't a criminal trial. You have - you can 
represent yourself in this case. You started out representing yourself. Mr. Athay 
came in shortly before the last scheduled hearing. The statute contemplates 
actually that a hearing like this is a fairly summary thing, and it takes place within 
10 days of the ex parte civil injunction being issued, and it's frequently the case 
that parties go forth without counsel. If you wanted different counsel, you should 
have arranged for that before today." R. 331 A: 5 (7-16) 
After addressing the production of the emails, the Court stated: 
" - you know what, we're going to go forward with this hearing today. This is -
these emails are at best tangential to the issues here. I mean, these - this is a pretty 
fairly narrow thing. Either she can prove two elements, two incidences of stalking, 
or she can't. And they really go, I guess, to the issue of whether or not under the 
circumstances of this case the petitioner would have experienced severe, 
emotional distress." R. 331 A: 7 (4-11). 
Mr. Maese proceeded pro se, giving opening and closing arguments, cross 
examining Ms. Curtis, and testifying on his own behalf. In his opening statement, Mr. 
Maese argued that "Even if the petitioner can show that I knew or should have known 
that my conduct would cause her distress - if the court finds that I had a right to 
investigate, then the court then needs to look at whether that conduct falls within a 
reasonable scope of that right." R. 331 A: 9 (16-24). 
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Ms. Curtis testified that while his trial was pending Mr. Maese told her that "he 
had no problem living with a scorched earth mentality and he would take himself down if 
it meant he could take me down. And he threatened me that if I ever testified against 
him, that's what he planned on doing." R. 331 A: 14 (6-9). She stated that in that 
conversation he said that if she moved to Arizona to escape him, "he'd perceived my 
moving as a threat to him. And that if I testified against him, that he would take evidence 
of me as an escort and give it to my father in law - ex father in law - to have my daughter 
taken away from me." R. 331A: 41 (12-16). 
Ms. Curtis testified that in one instance after the criminal charges were filed 
against Mr. Maese he grabbed her wrists tightly, shook her violently, and spit in her face. 
R. 331A: 15 (5-13). She testified that on July 27, 2007 she fought with Mr. Maese and 
told him she did not want to be involved with him anymore. Mr. Maese came to her 
location and raped her. R. 331A: 18 (1-2). She said "He raped me. I told him no over 
and over, and he raped me." R. 331A: 18 (3-4). She testified that in April of 2008, as she 
was anticipating testifying against him, Mr. Maese followed her from school to a hotel, 
where he circled the parking lot looking for her. R. 331 A: 21 (3-10). She testified that in 
April 2008 he followed her from school onto the freeway entrance at 500 South and all 
the way to about 6200 South. During this following, Mr. Maese circled her car at least 
one and a half times- moving from behind, to the side, to the front, and then to the left. R. 
331 A: 22. Ms. Curtis testified that she called a detective and reported the conduct. 
When Mr. Maese cross examined Ms. Curtis, who testified the act threatened her, she 
explained, "Why would you do that if you didn't have some sort of purpose?" R. 331 A: 
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40 (9-10). Mr. Maese testified that the timing of their entrance on the freeway and 
similar speeds for about 15 miles was purely accidental and that at the time he was not 
acting as his own private investigator. R. 331 A: 56 (13); R. 331 A: 52 (17). 
Ms. Curtis testified that Mr. Maese told her on several occasions that he knew she 
was going to testify. R. 331 A: 44 (1-9). She said that his knowledge that she would be a 
state's witness against him made her feel even more threatened by his behavior. Id. She 
stated "he had told me that he would ruin me if I testified." Id 
On cross examination, Mr. Maese repeatedly asked Ms. Curtis if she was a 
prostitute, arguing on objection that her credibility was an issue and he intended to use 
this information to impeach her. Mr. Maese explained to the court that he was 
investigating Ms. Curtis to prove she was a prostitute, which would violate her probation 
agreement in the criminal case. R. 331 A: 29 (3-9). He inferred that she would be lying to 
her probation agent, which could show she was lying in this case. For the majority of his 
cross examination of Ms. Curtis, Mr. Maese asked questions to establish the frequency 
and the locations of Ms. Curtis's acts of prostitution. R. 331 A: 37. 
Mr. Maese admitted in his own testimony that he had actively searched for Ms. 
Curtis during the time his case was pending. He admitted that he was acting as his own 
investigator in his criminal case because he believed Ms. Curtis may be testifying against 
him at trial. R. 331 A: 48-49 (15); R.331 A: 49 (22-24). He testified that he drove to 
"between a half a dozen and a dozen hotels that I knew Ms. Curtis had stayed at just 
about every day to find out which one she was at." R. 331 A: 50 (7-9). He later hired a 
private investigator. R. 331 A: 51 (21). 
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At the conclusion of his testimony, Mr. Maese stated he had one rebuttal witness 
that was not present. R. 331 A: 59 (4-5). Mr. Maese stated his rebuttal witness was a 
private investigator who would dispute Ms. Curtis's statement that she was so upset after 
the driving incident that she could not work. He alleged that the private investigator 
videotaped Ms. Curtis at a hotel that day to show she was working as a prostitute. 
R.331A: 59 (8-14). The Court stated it was not continuing the trial for that purpose and 
asked Mr. Maese if he had any other evidence. R. 331 A: 59 (15-16). Mr. Maese 
indicated he did not have any other evidence. Id In contrast to the statements he has 
made to this Court, he did not inform the court at this time - or at any other time - that he 
intended to call Ms. Curtis's probation officer or an investigator from the District 
Attorney's office. 
In his closing argument, Mr. Maese argued that he was not on notice that his mere 
presence would upset Ms. Curtis. R. 331 A: 63 (8-9). He argued that under the reasonable 
person standard, "I don't think any reasonable prostitute would be scared for something 
other than being discovered as a prostitute by my conduct, by simply driving through a 
parking lot and leaving the scene." R. 331 A: 63 (19-23). Mr. Maese argued that "Her 
circumstances are - even if you accept her testimony that she is going to testify against 
me, she is a prostitute. She's communicated to me that she's a prostitute on several 
occasions." R.331 A: 61 (6-9). 
He then argued that even if his mere presence was the problem the court should 
deny the injunction because of his "right to investigate." R. 331 A: 65 (15-16). Mr. Maese 
conceded a stalking injunction would be appropriate if he was going to follow her to a 
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"Subway sandwich with her child" but it was not appropriate where he was going to 
places that she is known to be a prostitute. R. 331A: 66 (12-25). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued a civil stalking injunction against 
Mr. Maese. R.282-83. It found the key fact in the case was that it was possible Ms. 
Curtis would testify against him in his criminal case during the time Mr. Maese admitted 
following her. R. 331 A: 64 (1-3). The court indicated that it did not know if Mr. Maese 
had a constitutional right to investigate Ms. Curtis, but "there's got to be limits on it, and 
it's got — whatever those limits are, they have got to be short of conduct that a 
reasonable - any reasonable person would think might be intimidating to a potential 
witness." R. 331 A: 66 (3-6). The court suggested that Mr. Maese could have achieved the 
same result without putting himself in a physical proximity to the potential witness. R. 
331 A: 67-68. 
The court concluded that "it's not irrelevant that she is a witness against you in a 
criminal trial, because it provides a backdrop for this." R. 331 A: 69 (19-22). He indicated 
that Mr. Maese's comments of a "scorched earth policy" indicates the way she might 
interpret his conduct. R. 331 A: 70 (14-24). The court said it was incredible that they 
would be riding together from 500 South to 6200 South, just thrown together by traffic 
and that Mr. Maese could not distance himself over 15 miles of freeway. Id. The court 
concluded, "I find your testimony incredible that you were doing anything other than 
intentionally staying in proximity to her." R. 331 A: 71 (23-25). 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
On March 16, 2009, the court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
finding that Mr. Maese stalked Ms. Curtis. The court found that Mr. Maese raped Ms. 
Curtis in July 2007, physically attacked her in April 2006, and had also verbally and 
physically threatened her. R. 285. The court found that Mr. Maese stalked Ms. Curtis 
when he followed and harassed her in her vehicle on April 17, 2008 and April 21,2008, 
in an attempt to intimidate her from testifying. R. 286. The court found that these two 
instances would cause "a reasonable person to experience emotional distress and alarm," 
particularly because Ms. Curtis was a witness in the criminal case against him. Id. The 
court also found that Mr. Maese knew or should have known Ms. Curtis would 
experience emotional distress as a result of his actions. Id. It stated that even if Mr. 
Maese had a right to investigate witnesses, those rights stop short of witness intimidation. 
R. 287. "A criminal defendant may not, under the guise of an investigation, conduct 
himself in a way that would intimidate potential witnesses against him." Id. 
Mr. Maese's Motion for a New Trial 
On March 20, 2009, Mr. Maese filed a pro se Motion for a New Trial, arguing that 
he was entitled to counsel at the civil stalking injunction hearing under both the U.S. and 
Utah Constitutions. In response to Ms. Curtis's Motion in Opposition of a New Trial, 
Mr. Maese filed a reply memorandum in which he argued for the first time that he was 
entitled to notice under Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On May 5, 
2009, the Court held a hearing on Mr. Maese's Motion for a New Trial. At the hearing, 
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Mr. Maese was represented by new counsel, Mr. Bruce Shapiro, who stated he was 
entering a limited appearance for the purposes of that hearing only. R. 349: 3-4. 
The Court denied Mr. Maese's motion at the hearing. Mr. Shapiro argued that Mr. 
Maese was unable to adequately prepare for the trial. Mr. Shapiro argued that Mr. Maese 
was "surprised as anybody when he came over and found that his attorney was not 
prepared." R. 349: 5 (16-18). He again stated that "he really was surprised." R. 349: 9 (5-
6); R. 349: 14 (2-3). Ms. Skordas quoted an affidavit submitted on Mr. Maese's behalf 
by another attorney that indicated Mr. Maese knew Mr. Athay would not file the 
frivolous motions. R. 349: 10 (4-10). The court stated it did not recall Mr. Athay's 
stating he was unprepared. Id. 
The court directly addressed Mr. Maese's arguments for lack of discovery and 
lack of witnesses by stating: "I haven't heard about any critical witness that would have 
affected the outcome of the case. And of course, Mr. Maese could have testified that he 
contacted his private investigator. You know, he could have given that testimony. But, 
you know, it just doesn't excuse - it doesn't excuse the conduct that he undertook in this 
case." R. 349: 17(17-23). 
Mr. Shapiro also argued that the charges were quasi-criminal. R. 349: 6 (4). The 
Court stated at the outset that "the right to counsel in a civil stalking injunction case is 
essentially the same as it is in any other civil case." R. 349: 3 (14-16). 
Mr. Shapiro only briefly addressed Rule 74(c) by arguing that the court had no 
discretion to relieve petitioner from filing a notice to appear or appoint counsel. R. 349: 
7 (22-25). The court only responded that the notice is waiveable. R. 349: 8 (5). The 
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Court also stated: "If I were to construe Rule 74 the way that Mr. Maese's asking me to, 
then any civil case a party could get a continuance merely by simply firing their attorney 
on the day of the trial, and that's not how it works. My actions in this case were 
completely consistent with Rule 74." R. 349: 4-5. 
Mr. Maese filed a Notice of Appeal on May 21, 2009. On July 10, 2009, the Utah 
Supreme Court assigned Mr. Maese's appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. On July 14, 
2009, the Utah Court of Appeals filed a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition and 
requested memoranda addressing whether it should grant summary disposition. On 
August 20, 2009, after briefing from both parties, the Court withdrew its Sua Sponte 
Motion for Summary Disposition and ordered this appeal to the next procedural phase. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Maese's motion to continue. 
The matter had already been continued several times, including at Mr. Maese's request, 
and Mr. Maese was not inconvenienced by the ruling. Mr. Maese's assertion that he had 
a legitimate reason to request a continuance because his attorney spontaneously withdrew 
is contradicted by his own testimony that he had contacted another lawyer before the 
hearing. Finally, Mr. Maese was not prejudiced by the denial of his motion to continue. 
The facts he desired to establish do not affect the basis for court's ruling. 
Mr. Maese was not entitled to written notice under Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure because he was on actual notice that his attorney had withdrawn. Mr. 
Maese was present at the hearing in which his attorney withdrew. Mr. Maese was also 
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not entitled to written notice under Rule 74(c) because he waived the issue by filing a 
Motion for New Trial 10 days later. His motion did not object to lack of notice. 
Mr. Maese is not entitled to counsel in a civil stalking injunction. Such cases are 
civil in nature - not criminal or quasi-criminal. His arguments that Due Process entitles 
him to an attorney in this proceeding are unsupported. 
Finally, this Court should find that Ms. Curtis is entitled to reasonable attorney's 
fees. Mr. Maese's appeal is not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. Rather, it 
is intended to continue his pattern of harassment of Ms. Curtis. This Court should also 
grant Ms. Curtis's reasonable attorneys fees based on Mr. Maese's inadequate briefing. 
Mr. Maese failed to include the actual holdings of which he disputes and failed to include 
the rationales that supported those holdings. In addition, his legal arguments regarding 
Rule 74(c) are unsupported by case law or the Rule's plain language. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MR. 
MAESE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(6)(a), a civil stalking injunction hearing 
"requested by the respondent shall be held within ten days from the date the request is 
filed with the court unless the court finds compelling reasons to continue the hearing. The 
hearing shall then be held at the earliest possible time." The court had already granted 
three continuances and was finally set to hold the hearing approximately five months 
after Mr. Maese's request for a hearing. 
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The grant or denial of a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court. "The 
trial court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant continuances and will 
not be reversed on appeal unless it has abused that discretion by acting unreasonably." 
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App., 1992) (internal citations omitted). The 
abuse of discretion standard is a highly deferential standard. An abuse of discretion can 
occur when a "serious inequity has resulted," English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 
(Utah 1977), or when a judge acts outside the bounds of the law. Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Courts consider five factors when determining whether a trial court abused its 
discretion in denying a continuance requested in order to obtain counsel: 1) whether other 
continuances have been requested and continued; 2) the balanced convenience or 
inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; 3) whether the requested 
delay is for legitimate reasons, whether it is dilatory, purposeful or contrived; 4) whether 
the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gave rise to the request for a 
continuance; and 5) whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice 
to defendant's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial 
nature." Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (internal 
citations omitted). Each factor shows that the court was within its discretion to deny the 
motion in this case. 
1. Mr. Maese benefitted from at least one prior continuance. 
While Mr. Maese argues that he had not requested prior continuances, at least the 
continuance immediately prior to the stalking injunction hearing was at his counsel's 
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urging and for his benefit.1 R. 331 A: 4 (19-25). The docket suggests that the 
continuances were stipulated to by counsel. As the court reasoned, further continuances 
in the case were not warranted because the hearing had already been postponed for six 
months - long after the 10 days intended for stalking hearings. 
2. Another continuance would have inconvenienced the parties. 
Mr. Maese argues that he was the only party inconvenienced by the denial of his 
motion to continue. He argues that Ms. Curtis was not inconvenienced because she was a 
full time student. However, Ms. Curtis had been inconvenienced because the proceeding 
had taken six months - not the 10 days contemplated by statute. Further continuances 
would also inconvenience the court. 
3. Mr, Maese had no legitimate reason to continue the hearing because his 
attorney's withdrawal was not spontaneous. 
Mr. Maese asserts that he had a legitimate reason to continue - the "spontaneous" 
withdrawal of his counsel. However, Mr. Athay's withdrawal could not have been 
spontaneous because both Mr. Maese and Mr. Athay stated that Mr. Maese had spoken to 
a different attorney about representation in this case. In an affidavit to the court, Kelly 
Ann Booth, an attorney familiar with Mr. Maese's case, stated that she had spoken to Mr. 
Athay regarding the hearing as early as February 23, 2009. R. 280, Attachment: 
Declaration of Kelly Ann Booth. Sometime between February 27, 2009, and March 3, 
2009, Ms. Booth said Mr. Athay's office told her Mr. Athay would not file a motion to 
continue. Id. She said Mr. Athay also told her he was going to argue the case was moot. 
1
 After Mr. Maese continued this hearing to protect his Fifth Amendment rights in his 
criminal trial in February 2009 he continued the criminal trial anyway until May 2009. 
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Id. At this point, Ms. Booth began looking for substitute counsel. Id. 
The stalking injunction hearing on March 6,2009, was scheduled at the 
evidentiary hearing on January 20, 2009. No continuances were granted between the two 
hearings. Mr. Maese had approximately a month and a half to prepare his case and was 
responsible to keep in contact with his attorney regarding the defenses he would assert. 
4. Mr. Maese contributed to his counsel's withdrawal by demanding actions his 
attorney would not take. 
Mr. Maese argues that he did not contribute to Mr. Athay's withdrawal; however, Mr. 
Athay stated that part of the breakdown was because he would not comply with some of 
Mr. Maese5 s demands. 
5. Mr. Maese was not prejudiced by the denial of the continuance because he 
had ample time to prepare for the hearing and planned to offer evidence 
irrelevant to the court's holding. 
Finally, Mr. Maese argues that he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion to 
continue. Appellate Brief P. 9. Despite having advanced notice of the hearing, Mr. Maese 
argues before this Court that he intended to call three witnesses had the hearing been 
continued. Id. Mr. Maese had approximately a month and a half to secure the witnesses' 
attendance at the hearing - he merely failed to do so. In addition, when asked if he had 
any other evidence at the stalking injunction hearing, Mr. Maese referenced only one of 
the three witnesses he now claims he would have called. R. 331 A: 59 (4-5). 
Mr. Maese asserts that he would have called a private investigator who watched 
Ms. Curtis, an investigator with the District Attorney's office, and Ms. Curtis's probation 
officer. Appellant's Brief P. 9. Mr. Maese argues that the investigator would testify that 
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he worked with Mr. Maese to investigate her, which justifies his actions. Id. at 9-10. Mr. 
Maese was not prejudiced by the denial to present this evidence. Mr. Maese testified to 
these facts, which the court directly addressed by stating that even if he had a right to 
investigate he had no right to investigate in a way that threatened a witness. R. 331 A: 66 
(3-6). 
Mr. Maese also argues that he was prejudiced by the inability to call the 
investigator to show that Ms. Curtis prostituted herself while on probation. Appellant's 
Brief P. 9. He also stated that he would call her probation officer to state that she lied to 
him about these offenses. However, Mr. Maese had already established at the hearing 
that he observed Ms. Curtis at hotels during this time and argued that no reasonable 
prostitute could be threatened by his behavior. The court concluded that evidence of her 
prostitution was irrelevant to the hearing. 
Mr. Maese also argues he was prejudiced because the denial of the continuance 
prevented him from presenting a witness that would have testified that "in his experience 
as a police officer, criminals often feel distress about being caught committing crimes but 
that criminals are not reasonable persons." Appellant's Brief P. 9. Nothing in the record 
suggests that such a witness exists. Mr. Maese argued that "Ms. Curtis never felt fear or 
distress and that a reasonable person in her circumstances (a person on probation 
engaging in specifically prohibited conduct) could not have felt fear or distress under the 
conduct alleged)." Id. at 10. This did not prejudice Mr. Maese because it is highly 
unlikely the court would not have allowed a witness to testify about whether Ms. Curtis 
was a reasonable person. 
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Mr. Maese argues he was prejudiced because his witnesses would have established 
a constitutionally-protected exception to Utah's stalking statute. Appellant's Brief P. 10. 
Again, the court would not have allowed a witness to make a legal conclusion about 
one's constitutional rights. Even so, in its Findings of Fact, the Court stated that any 
rights he may have - without stating he had such rights - stopped short of witness 
tampering. R. 287. 
Mr. Maese next argues that he was prejudiced because he did not have time to 
enforce the subpoena in which he requested Ms. Curtis's emails. However the court had 
already heard evidence that Mr. Maese likely obtained this information in his criminal 
case and that it was his attorney's delay that caused the omission. R. 331A: 5-6; 6 (8-10). 
The court also ruled the issue was immaterial because the emails were tangential at best. 
R.331 A: 7 (5-8). Mr. Maese argues that these emails would show he was not on notice 
from Ms. Curtis that "any future contact, no matter how benign, would cause stress or be 
interpreted as intimidating." Appellant's Brief P. 11. However, the court found that his 
behavior was not benign because he purposely followed her while she was a witness in 
his criminal case. The court expressly held that this was not irrelevant conduct. R. 
331A: 69 (19-22). 
Mr. Maese also argues that he was prejudiced because he was ill-prepared to 
defend himself pro se. Appellant's Brief P. 11-12. The court directly addressed this 
assertion by noting that Mr. Maese had proceeded pro se throughout the case and had 
submitted a 19 page hearing memo with citations to case law. R. 331 A: 5 (10-11)., In 
addition, Mr. Maese proceeded at the hearing far in advance of most pro se litigants, 
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which are already granted leeway. He objected based on relevancy, opinion testimony, 
based on testimony that the prejudicial value outweighed the probative value, he twice 
objected based on Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence, and twice objected for lack of 
foundation. R:331 A: 12(2-4); 14(11); 16(11-12); 17 (6-9); 44 (14-17). He asked to voir 
dire Ms. Curtis in the middle of her testimony. R.331 A: 13(11-12). He requested that the 
parties approach the bench to speak of the record. R.331 A: 15. He moved to strike 
testimony based on no nexus to connect him to the testimony. R.331 A: 19 (18-20). He 
limited Ms. Curtis's answers on cross to merely "yes" or "no." R.331 A: 34 (23-24). He 
objected to being called as a witness for Ms. Curtis citing law that limited opposing 
counsel's questioning to the scope given on direct. R.331 A: 46 (1-4). He also quoted 
recent changes in the relevant statute. R.331 A: 68 (17-22). 
The court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Maese's motion to continue. 
No serious inequity resulted, the ruling was not beyond the limits of reasonability, the 
court's actions were not inherently unfair, the court considered all legally relevant factors 
and acted within the bounds of the law. Most importantly, there are no facts in the record 
to suggest a more favorable outcome if Mr. Maese was represented by counsel. Mr. 
Maese did not dispute that the alleged events occurred; rather, Mr. Maese asserted Ms. 
Curtis should not have felt threatened and that he had a constitutional right to investigate 
her. The court directly rejected Mr. Maese's claims and no other witness testimony 
could have altered the court's decision. 
20 
II. MR. MAESE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RULE 74(C) NOTICE 
BECAUSE HE WAS ON ACTUAL NOTICE HIS ATTORNEY HAD 
WITHDRAWN AND HE WAIVED THE ISSUE. 
Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
If an attorney withdraws . . . the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or 
Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented party, informing the party of the 
responsibility to appear personally or appoint counsel.. . No further proceedings 
shall be held in the case until 20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel unless the unrepresented party waives the time requirement or unless 
otherwise ordered by the court. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 74(c). 
The Utah Court of Appeals holds that it is unnecessary to give an unrepresented 
party written notice under Rule 74(c) if he already had notice. Elsbury v. Elsbury, 2001 
UT App 217 (unpublished opinion). In Elsbury, the trial court required the appellant's 
attorney to represent the appellant through a contempt hearing but when it concluded the 
attorney withdrew and the appellant proceeded pro se. Id. Relying on Rule 74(c), the 
court held that even though the trial court suggested that the appellee's counsel give 
appellant notice to appear or appoint counsel, "this was unnecessary because [appellant] 
was already on notice of his duty to appear or appoint counsel and had already appeared 
as counsel for himself." Id. at f l . 
A party must receive notice under Rule 74 if he or she was not present at the court 
hearing at which her counsel withdrew and would not have otherwise known about his 
withdrawal. Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT 175. In Loporto, a woman in a divorce 
action was unable to attend her trial but her attorney told her that "it was unnecessary for 
her to personally appear." Id. at f^ 3. At the trial, her attorney moved to withdraw from 
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the case. The trial court granted his motion, struck his pleadings and entered the 
woman's default. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ordered reversal because opposing 
counsel did not file Rule 74(c) notice. Id. at ^ 9. It found that the trial court excused the 
woman's agent "but attempted to hold her accountable even though she was not present 
and was no longer represented by counsel." Id. at Tf 13. 
Like Elsbury and unlike Loporto, Mr. Maese was present at the proceeding at 
which his counsel withdrew. He was on notice of his duty to appear at the hearing that he 
was already present to conduct. Rule 74 notice was just as unnecessary in this case as it 
was in Elsbury. Furthermore, the woman in Loporto experienced tremendous prejudice -
the dismissal of her counsel's pleadings and a default judgment. In contrast, Mr. Maese 
suffered no prejudice in this case. He was able to argue the motion that he wrote, 
conduct cross examination of the witnesses against him, testify on his own behalf, and 
deliver closing arguments. 
Without legal support, Mr. Maese makes at least six unsupported, irrelevant 
arguments regarding Rule 74 (c), each of which will be addressed in turn: 
1. The trial court held its actions were consistent with the rule; its inherent 
ability to require counsel to represent a litigant is the functional 
equivalent of requiring that a litigant proceed pro se. Appellant's Brief P. 
13;and 
2. Rule 74(c)'s plain language does not permit a trial court to compel a 
litigant to proceed pro se. It does not contain an option to force a litigant 
to proceed pro se. Mr. Maese argues that "a holding to the contrary guts 
the plain language and intent of Rule 74; that litigants must decide 
whether to represent themselves or retain attorney representation. 
Appellant's Brief P. 15. 
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Mr. Maese fails to quote the trial court's finding that it complied with Rule 74(c). 
Ms. Curtis assumes he refers to the court's statement that "If I were to construe Rule 74 
the way that Mr. Maese's asking me to, then any civil case a party could get a 
continuance merely by simply firing their attorney on the day of the trial, and that's not 
how it works. My actions in this case were completely consistent with Rule 74." R. 349: 
4-5. 
Mr. Maese also failed to include legal support for his contention that "its inherent 
ability to require counsel to represent a litigant is the functional equivalent of requiring 
that a litigant proceed pro se." Rule 74(c) does not address the court's ability or inability 
to require a litigant to proceed pro se. It merely dictates the procedure for after an 
attorney withdraws. Mr. Maese fails to develop this argument in any meaningful manner 
to which Ms. Curtis can respond. 
In this case, the Court based its decision on whether to grant Mr. Athay's motion 
to withdraw on Mr. Maese's assent and on both parties' representation that their 
relationship had broken down and did not force Mr. Maese to proceed pro se under Rule 
74(c). 
3. The choice to proceed with counsel who has declared his ineffectiveness 
or proceed alone is inherently prejudicial and under Utah law, is a false 
dichotomy. Appellant's Brief P. 13. 
Mr. Maese fails to cite any cases that support his allegation that this choice is 
inherently prejudicial under Utah law. As is addressed below, Mr. Maese does not have a 
right to counsel in a civil stalking proceeding. He also fails to describe how he was 
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prejudiced. Counsel did not withdraw because he declared his ineffectiveness. Counsel 
withdrew because he would not file motions Mr. Maese wanted him to file. 
4. Due Process required the trial court to grant Mr. Maese's counsel's 
motion to withdraw based on State v. Lovell, in which the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that good cause must be shown to warrant a substitution of 
counsel. Appellant's Brief P. 14-15. 
It is unclear what Mr. Maese is arguing being as the trial court in fact granted the 
motion. Good cause was shown to warrant a substitution of counsel in this case. In fact, 
Mr. Maese stipulated to Mr. Athay's withdrawal. R. 331A: 4 (9-10). 
State v. Lovell is also inapplicable to the allegation asserted by Mr. Maese. 1999 
UT 40. In Lovell the defendant pled guilty to aggravated murder and waived his right to 
be sentenced by a jury and was sentenced to death. The Utah Supreme Court held that 
the lower court's failure to inquire into defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel was 
harmless where it was clear that defendant's allegations did not rise to the constitutional 
level requiring appointment of new counsel and because evidence separate from his 
dissatisfaction showed that defendant implicated himself in other statements. IdL_ at f^ 31. 
The case reiterates the standard for substitution of counsel; however, Mr. Maese does not 
dispute that counsel was entitled to withdraw in his case. 
5. The trial court did not use waiver as the basis for its ruling; even if it was 
waived, the trial court resuscitated the issue when it addressed the merits 
in the hearing on Mr. Maese's Motion for a New Trial. 
Under Rule 74(c), notice of a party's counsel's withdraw is not needed if the party 
has waived such notice. In Migliore v. Migliore, a husband in a divorce proceeding 
relied on Loporto to argue that the judgments against him were rendered in violation of 
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Rule 74(c). 2008 UT App 208. The trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals both 
distinguished Migliore from Loporto and found that, unlike Loporto, the husband was 
fully aware of, and had participated in, the proceedings. It also distinguished Loporto on 
waiver grounds because the "husband waived any objection under this rule... when 
husband entered an appearance in this case and proceeded without reference to Rule 74." 
Id. The Utah Court of Appeals emphasized the last line of the Rule, which states that no 
proceeding shall be held "unless the unrepresented party waives the time requirement or 
unless otherwise ordered by the court." Id (emphasis in original). Likewise, Mr. Maese is 
barred from raising a Rule 74 objection because waived that argument in his March 20, 
2009 Motion for a New Trial. He did not address this issue until his Reply Memorandum 
submitted on April 1, 2009. 
Mr. Maese fails to articulate how the court resuscitated the issue of waiver when it 
addressed the merits in the hearing on Mr. Maese's Motion for a New Trial. Mr. Maese 
merely relies on State v. Seale for this proposition. 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993). In 
contrast to Seale, in which the defendant raised the issue in his Motion for a New Trial 
and the court addressed it on the merits in the defendant's hearing on the motion, Mr. 
Maese's Motion for a New Trial did not address the notice requirement of Rule 74(c). He 
did not address Rule 74(c) until his Reply Memorandum, which was submitted 
approximately 11 days later. The court did not address the issue on the merits at the 
hearing; in fact, the court's only reference to waiver was by pointing out that the issue is 
waiveable. R. 349: 8 (5). 
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6. The trial court failed to comply with Rule 74(c) and crafted a post hoc 
rationalization that is unsupported by the Rule's plain language. 
Appellant's Brief P. 15. 
Mr. Maese fails to state which "ad hoc rationalization" the court crafted regarding 
Rule 74(c). The court referred only briefly to Rule 74(c), granting most of the argument 
at the hearing to Mr. Maese's claim of surprise and lack of witnesses. It is impossible 
for Ms. Curtis to respond to allegations that are unclear and unsupported. 
III. MR. MAESE IS NOT ENTITLED TO COUNSEL IN A CIVIL 
STALKING INJUNCTION CASE, 
In his prior filings, Mr. Maese asserted his right to counsel at the civil stalking 
injunction. In his Memorandum in Opposition of Sua Sponte Disposition, Mr. Maese 
asserted that his "interest in personal freedom triggers both the Utah and United States 
Constitutions' Due Process clause," which manifests as a right to counsel. Memorandum 
P. 5. In his docketing statement, Mr. Maese asserted that a civil stalking injunction is a 
quasi-criminal proceeding under which the Due Process Clause of the Utah and U.S. 
Constitutions grant the respondent the right of counsel. Docketing Statement, P. 2. 
However, Mr. Maese failed to brief this issue in his Brief of Appellant. In his 
Brief, under a heading "where counsel declares a breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship, Due Process required that the trial court grant Mr. Maese's counsel's motion 
to withdraw," Mr. Maese argues that the issue is "fundamentally a due process 
argument." Appellant's Brief P. 14. For support he cites to Pangea Techs, Inc. v. Internet 
Promotions, Inc., 2004 UT 40. In Pangea, a judgment creditor sued the debtor's bank as 
garnishee, alleging the bank improperly released funds from debtor's accounts that were 
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subject to writ of garnishment. Id. The district court entered judgment without hearing in 
favor of creditor. The Utah Supreme Court held that bank was entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on creditor's claim that bank was liable for release of funds subject to 
garnishment. The court's due process analysis only addressed whether the new matter 
raised in pleadings "would inevitably cause garnishees to be deprived of due process." 
Id. at 1J8 (emphasis added). The case does not address the right to counsel.2 
Even if Mr. Maese adequately briefed this issue, neither the Utah Supreme Court 
nor the U.S. Supreme Court has held that civil stalking injunctions are quasi-criminal 
proceedings. Juvenile criminal cases and contempt cases are among the few matters 
defined as quasi-criminal. See Houskeeper v. State. 2008 UT 78; Race v. Race. 740 P.2d 
253, 258 (Utah 1987). 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. 
Const, amend. VI. As a party to a civil action, Mr. Maese had no right to counsel in this 
case. "The Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and to have assistance of 
counsel pertains only to criminal prosecutions." State v. One 1980 Cadillac. 2001 UT 26, 
2
 Mr. Maese also failed to brief and preserve this argument under the standard set forth by 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Worwood. 2007 UT 47; see also Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 2005 UT 13, \ 14 (reversed on other grounds). 
3
 Even if he was entitled to counsel, the error was harmless because there was no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
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f 14 ; Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) ("it is well settled that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not implicated in noncriminal proceedings").4 
While neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals have 
addressed whether an individual has the right to counsel in a civil stalking case, Utah 
courts have held that there is no right to counsel in forfeiture proceedings or in civil 
petitions for post-conviction relief. One 1980 Cadillac at f 14; Pirela v. State. 2005 UT 
App 471 (unpublished opinion). The only exception to the rule that there is a right to 
counsel in civil cases is when the State seeks to terminate one's parental rights.5 
While neither Utah courts nor the U.S. Supreme Court have ever held that a civil 
stalking appellant has a right to counsel, at least one state holds that an individual does 
not have the right to counsel in a civil stalking injunction. When deciding whether a 
respondent was entitled to court-appointed counsel in an appeal from the issuance of a 
stalking protective order, the Court of Appeals of Oregon held that he had no right to 
counsel because the matter is civil in nature. Johnson v. McGrew, 902 P.2d 1209 (Or. 
App. 1995). 
A civil stalking injunction is a civil matter. The Utah Court of Appeals addressed 
the criminal-civil distinction of civil stalking injunctions in Ellison v. Stam. 2006 UT 
App 150, f 23-24. In analyzing the emotional distress element of the statute, the 
4
 The right to appointed counsel only attaches in misdemeanor cases if the defendant 
actually has been imprisoned or received a suspended sentence. State v. Von Ferguson, 
2007 UT1. 
5
 Thus, Mr. Maese's citation to Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham 
County. 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) does not support his claim that he has a right to counsel 
in this matter. Docketing Statement, P. 6, n. 8. 
28 
respondent urged the court to find that the term's definition in an earlier criminal case 
was "inapplicable in the context of civil stalking injunctions." Id. at f^ 22. The Court 
disagreed, pointing to the "legislature's express instruction that both criminal and civil 
stalking be proved by the same elements." Id. at ^ 23. The Court held that the statute 
"merely incorporates by reference the definition of criminal stalking." Id.. The Court 
clearly reasoned that actions brought by an individual under Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 
were civil and distinct from charges brought by the State under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106.5. 
Furthermore, the petitioner's burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence in 
a civil stalking hearing, along with the title of the statute, is persuasive evidence the 
Legislature intended proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 to be civil in nature. 
As a result of the proceedings, the court will either extend or revoke the ex parte 
injunction, neither of which are criminal punishments. Criminal penalties may only be 
enforced if the respondent fails to abide by the order. 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT MS. CURTIS IS ENTITLED TO 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
A court shall award damages, including reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party against whom a motion was made or an appeal taken that is frivolous or for delay. 
Utah R. App. Pro. 33. A frivolous appeal is one that is "not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law." Utah R. App. Pro 33(b). A motion is submitted for the purpose of 
delay when it "is interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless 
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increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the 
appeal." Id. Sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases. 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (1988). However, sanctions should be imposed when 
appeal is obviously without merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of 
prevailing. Id 
This case is merely a continuation of Mr. Maese's pattern of harassment against 
Ms. Curtis. Mr. Maese justified his rights to follow Ms. Curtis because he asserted he 
had the right to investigate a witness against him. As Mr. Maese has already been 
convicted, he has no use for further impeachment evidence, despite the fact that his 
appeal is pending. His brief continues to harass her by repeatedly labeling her a lying 
prostitute, stating he had video surveillance he wanted to show of her clients coming and 
leaving hotel rooms. Testimony also suggested Mr. Maese was obtaining information 
about Ms. Curtis's prostitution to get her child removed from her care. 
This Court can also award sanctions based on inadequate briefing. In re Estate of 
Pahl, 2007 UT App 389 f 17 (citing Utah R. App. Pro 24(a)(9)). In Pahl, the Utah Court 
of Appeals awarded Petitioner her reasonable attorneys fees based on Respondents' 
shifting the burden of argument and research to other entities. Id. "A reviewing court is 
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply 
a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research. Id (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 
(Utah 1998) ("While failure to cite to pertinent authority may not always render an issue 
inadequately briefed, it does so when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to 
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shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court."). The Court in Pahl 
noted the "convoluted" nature of the respondent's brief, which "placed a tremendous 
burden of factual and legal research on [Petitioner]." Id, 
This case is just like Pahl. The court in Pahl faced "many issues completely 
lacking in cogent analysis or supporting authority." Under his argument regarding Rule 
74(c), Mr. Maese attributes to the trial court numerous holdings with which he gives no 
citations or explanation. Mr. Maese is obligated to provide this Court and Ms. Curtis 
specific references to the holdings with which he disputes. Furthermore, his arguments 
under Rule 74(c) are unrelated to the plain language of the rule and assert legal 
arguments unsupported by legal citations. Mr. Maese put this Court and Ms. Curtis in the 
undesirable position of determining the law on which he relies. While pro se litigants are 
given leeway, Mr. Maese had demonstrated in his pre-hearing brief below, in his oral 
argument at the hearing, in his Motion for New Trial, in his Memorandum in Opposition 
to Sua Sponte Disposition, his Motion to Strike, and in other portions of his Appellant's 
Brief that he understands the importance of legal citations and understands the 
importance of court rules. The arguments made by Mr. Maese were simply meant to 
further harass Ms. Curtis. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the aforementioned arguments, Ms. Curtis urges the Court to find that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Maese's motion to continue, that 
Mr. Maese did not have a right to counsel at the hearing, and that there were no violations 
of Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Curtis also requests this Court to 
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award her reasonable attorney's fees based on the frivolous nature of this appeal and the 
inadequate briefing provided. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this of December, 2009. 
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE, LLC 
V laAw \A) JdhAA^ 
Tasha M. Williams 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury Trials 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
"SAnnotated 
*lAmendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos) 
Amendment VI, Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 5. Offenses Against the Person (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. Assault and Related Offenses 
§ 76-5-106.5. Stalking-Definitions-Iniunction-Penalties 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" means: 
(i) a verdict or conviction; 
(ii) a plea of guilty or guilty and mentally ill; 
(iii) a plea of no contest; or 
(iv) the acceptance by the court of a plea in abeyance. 
(b) "Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or toward a specific person, including: 
(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or 
about a person, or interferes with a person's property: 
(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and 
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or 
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone else to engage in any of these acts: 
(A) approaches or confronts a person; 
(B) appears at the person's workplace or contacts the person's employer or coworkers; 
(C) appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's neighbors, or enters property owned, leased, or 
occupied by a person; 
(D) sends material by any means to the person or for the purpose of obtaining or disseminating information 
about or communicating with the person to a member of the person's family or household, employer, 
coworker, friend, or associate of the person; 
(E) places an object on or delivers an object to property owned, leased, or occupied by a person, or to the 
person's place of employment with the intent that the object be delivered to the person; or 
(F) uses a computer, the Internet, text messaging, or any other electronic means to commit an act that is a part 
of the course of conduct. 
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(c) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the 
household or who regularly resided in the household within the prior six months. 
(d) "Emotional distress" means significant mental or psychological suffering, whether or not medical or other 
professional treatment or counseling is required. 
(e) "Reasonable person" means a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. 
(f) "Stalking" means an offense as described in Subsection (2) or (3). 
(g) "Text messaging" means a communication in the form of electronic text or one or more electronic images sent 
by the actor from a telephone or computer to another person's telephone or computer by addressing the 
communication to the recipient's telephone number. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a 
specific person and knows or should know that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person: 
(a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or 
(b) to suffer other emotional distress. 
(3) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates: 
(a) a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions; or 
(b) a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section. 
(4) In any prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that the actor: 
(a) was not given actual notice that the course of conduct was unwanted; or 
(b) did not intend to cause the victim fear or other emotional distress. 
(5) An offense of stalking may be prosecuted under this section in any jurisdiction where one or more of the acts that 
is part of the course of conduct was initiated or caused an effect on the victim. 
(6) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor: 
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or 
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions. 
(7) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is substantially similar to the offense of 
stalking; 
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(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any crime in another jurisdiction which if 
committed in Utah would be a felony, in which the victim of the stalking offense or a member of the victim's 
immediate family was also a victim of the previous felony offense; 
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection (9); or 
(e) has been or is at the time of the offense a cohabitant, as defined in Section 78B-7-102, of the victim. 
(8) Stalking is a second degree felony if the offender: 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used other means or force likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the crime of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses that are substantially 
similar to the offense of stalking; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under Subsection (7)(a), (b), or (c); 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction 
or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a 
victim of the previous felony offenses; or 
(f) has been previously convicted of an offense under Subsection (7)(d), (e), or (f). 
(9)(a) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in abeyance for a period of time serves as an 
application for a permanent criminal stalking injunction limiting the contact between the defendant and the victim. 
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the court without a hearing unless the defendant 
requests a hearing at the time of the conviction. The court shall give the defendant notice of the right to request a 
hearing. 
(c) If the defendant requests a hearing under Subsection (9)(b), it shall be held at the time of the conviction unless 
the victim requests otherwise, or for good cause. 
(d) If the conviction was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of the judgment and conviction or a certified 
copy of the court's order holding the plea in abeyance must be filed by the victim in the district court as an 
application and request for a hearing for a permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
(10) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following relief: 
(a) an order: 
(i) restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or place of employment of the 
victim; and 
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(ii) requiring the defendant to stay away from the victim and members of the victim's immediate family or 
household and to stay away from any specified place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by 
the victim; and 
(b) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with or regarding the victim, including an order 
forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent initiating any communication likely to cause 
annoyance or alarm to the victim, including personal, written, or telephone contact with or regarding the victim, 
with the victim's employers, employees, coworkers, friends, associates, or others with whom communication 
would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim. 
(11) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved or dismissed only upon application of the victim to 
the court which granted the injunction. 
(12) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to this section shall be sent by the court to the 
statewide warrants network or similar system. 
(13) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section has effect statewide. 
(14)(a) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section constitutes a third degree felony offense of stalking 
under Subsection (7). 
(b) Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a criminal action initiated by a 
prosecuting attorney, or both. 
(15) This section does not preclude the filing of a criminal information for stalking based on the same act which is 
the basis for the violation of the stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or a 
permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1992. c. 188. g 1: Laws 1994. c. 206. § 1; Laws 1996. c. 151. 6 1. eff. April 29. 1996; Laws 1997. c. 10. § 
129. eff. Mav 5. 1997: Laws 1999. c. 96. § 1. eff. May 3. 1999: Laws 2000. c. 49. S 1. eff. Mav 1. 2000: Laws 
2001. c. 276. § 1. eff. July 1. 2001; Laws 2008. c. 356. $ 2, eff. May 5. 2008. 
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Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 3A. Stalking Injunctions(Refs & Annos) 
§ 77-3a-101. Civil stalking injunction—Petition—Ex parte injunction 
(1) As used in this chapter, "stalking" means the crime of stalking as defined in Section 76-5-106.5. 
Stalking injunctions may not be obtained against law enforcement officers, governmental investigators, or licensed 
private investigators, acting in their official capacity. 
(2) Any person who believes that he or she is the victim of stalking may file a verified written petition for a civil 
stalking injunction against the alleged stalker with the district court in the district in which the petitioner or 
respondent resides or in which any of the events occurred. A minor with his or her parent or guardian may file a 
petition on his or her own behalf, or a parent, guardian, or custodian may file a petition on the minor's behalf. 
(3) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms for petitions, ex parte civil 
stalking injunctions, civil stalking injunctions, service and any other necessary forms in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter on or before July 1, 2001. The office shall provide the forms to the clerk of each district 
court. 
(a) All petitions, injunctions, ex parte injunctions, and any other necessary forms shall be issued in the form 
adopted by the Administrative Office of the Courts. 
(b) The offices of the court clerk shall provide the forms to persons seeking to proceed under this chapter. 
(4) The petition for a civil stalking injunction shall include: 
(a) the name of the petitioner; however, the petitioner's address shall be disclosed to the court for purposes of 
service, but, on request of the petitioner, the address may not be listed on the petition, and shall be protected and 
maintained in a separate document or automated database, not subject to release, disclosure, or any form of public 
access except as ordered by the court for good cause shown; 
(b) the name and address, if known, of the respondent; 
(c) specific events and dates of the actions constituting the alleged stalking; 
(d) if there is a prior court order concerning the same conduct, the name of the court in which the order was 
rendered; and 
(e) corroborating evidence of stalking, which may be in the form of a police report, affidavit, record, statement, 
item, letter, or any other evidence which tends to prove the allegation of stalking. 
(5) If the court determines that there is reason to believe that an offense of stalking has occurred, an ex parte civil 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
u t A i y^ j § / / - j a - i u i *£,w ^ 
stalking injunction may be issued by the court that includes any of the following 
(a) respondent may be enjomed from committing stalking, 
(b) respondent may be restrained from coming near the residence, place of employment, or school of the other 
party or specifically designated locations or persons, 
(c) respondent may be restrained from contacting, directly or indirectly, the other party, including personal, 
written or telephone contact with the other party, the other party's employers, employees, fellow workers or others 
with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the other party, or 
(d) any other relief necessary or convenient for the protection of the petitioner and other specifically designated 
persons under the circumstances 
(6) Within ten days of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the respondent is entitled to request, in 
writing, an evidentiary hearing on the civil stalking injunction 
(a) A hearing requested by the respondent shall be held within ten days from the date the request is filed with the 
court unless the court finds compelling reasons to continue the hearing The hearing shall then be held at the 
earliest possible time The burden is on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking of 
the petitioner by the respondent has occurred 
(b) An ex parte civil stalking injunction issued under this section shall state on its face 
(1) that the respondent is entitled to a hearmg, upon written request within ten days of the service of the order, 
(n) the name and address of the district court where the request may be filed, 
(in) that if the respondent fails to request a hearing within ten days of service, the ex parte civil 
stalking injunction is automatically modified to a civil stalking injunction without further notice to the 
respondent and that the civil stalking injunction expires three years after service of the ex parte civil 
stalking injunction, and 
(IV) that if the respondent requests, in writing, a hearing after the ten-day period after service, the court shall set 
a hearmg within a reasonable time from the date requested 
(7) At the hearing, the court may modify, revoke, or contmue the mjunction The burden is on the petitioner to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the respondent has occurred 
(8) The ex parte civil stalking injunction and civil stalking injunction shall include the following statement 
"Attention This is an official court order If you disobey this order, the court may find you m contempt You may 
also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other crime you may have committed m disobeying 
this order " 
(9) The ex parte civil stalking injunction shall be served on the respondent within 90 days from the date it is 
signed An ex parte civil stalking injunction is effective upon service If no hearing is requested in wntmg by the 
respondent withm ten days of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the ex parte civil stalking mjunction 
automatically becomes a civil stalking injunction without further notice to the respondent and expires three years 
from the date of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction 
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(10) If the respondent requests a hearing after the ten-day period after service, the court shall set a hearing within a 
reasonable time from the date requested. At the hearing, the burden is on the respondent to show good cause why the 
civil stalking injunction should be dissolved or modified. 
(11) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been returned, excluding weekends and 
holidays, the clerk of the court from which the ex parte civil stalking injunction was issued shall enter a copy of the 
ex parte civil stalking injunction and proof of service or acceptance of service in the statewide network for 
warrants or a similar system. 
(a) The effectiveness of an ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction shall not depend upon 
its entry in the statewide system and, for enforcement purposes, a certified copy of an ex parte civil 
stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction is presumed to be a valid existing order of the court for a period 
of three years from the date of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction on the respondent. 
(b) Any changes or modifications of the ex parte civil stalking injunction are effective upon service on the 
respondent. The original ex parte civil stalking injunction continues in effect until service of the changed or 
modified civil stalking injunction on the respondent. 
(12) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been returned, excluding weekends and 
holidays, the clerk of the court shall enter a copy of the changed or modified civil stalking injunction and proof of 
service or acceptance of service in the statewide network for warrants or a similar system. 
(13) The ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction may be dissolved at any time upon 
application of the petitioner to the court which granted it. 
(14) The court clerk shall provide, without charge, to the petitioner one certified copy of the injunction issued by the 
court and one certified copy of the proof of service of the injunction on the respondent. Charges may be imposed by 
the clerk's office for any additional copies, certified or not certified in accordance with Rule 4-202.08 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
(15) The remedies provided in this chapter for enforcement of the orders of the court are in addition to any other 
civil and criminal remedies available. The district court shall hear and decide all matters arising pursuant to this 
section. 
(16) After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the court may enter an order requiring any party to pay the 
costs of the action, including reasonable attorney fees. 
(17) This chapter does not apply to protective orders or ex parte protective orders issued pursuant to Title 78B, 
Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or to preliminary injunctions issued pursuant to an action for dissolution of 
marriage or legal separation. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2001. c. 276, § 3, eff. July 1, 2001: Laws 2008, c. 3, g 248, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
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State Court Rules 
3§_Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*1 Title V. General Provisions 
-f RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order indi-
cated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
authorities cited, wiih references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of 
the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the perti-
nent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an adden-
dum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceed-
ings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of 
the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the is-
sues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
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authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum 
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opin-
ion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; 
and 
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such 
as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the 
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may 
refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-
appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the 
reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs 
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a mini-
mum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designa-
tions used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such 
as "the employee," "the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11 (g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequen-
tial number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits 
shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or re-
jected. 
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(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs 
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases 
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to 
file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to 
the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which 
shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon 
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity 
the issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A 
motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking 
more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the mo-
tion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the 
court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or appel-
lee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply 
briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party 
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the 
clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the 
Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference 
either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state the 
reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be 
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically ar-
ranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; 
November 1, 2004; April 1,2006; November 1, 2006; April 1, 2008.] 
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, ,^1 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*H Title V. General Provisions 
-• RULE 33. DAMAGES FOR DELAY OR FRIVOLOUS APPEAL; RECOVERY OF ATTOR-
NEY'S FEES 
(a) Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court deter-
mines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just dam-
ages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the pre-
vailing party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit 
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A party may request damages 
under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's 
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney 
or both an order to show cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the 
allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise 
ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 33 is substantially redrafted to provide definitions and procedures for assessing penalties for delays and frivo-
lous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court must award damages. This is in keeping with Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the amount of damages-single or double costs or attorney fees or both-is left to 
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended to make express the authority of the court to impose sanctions upon 
the party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
the conflict created for appointed counsel by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). Under the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by 
the defendant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
*H Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*i Part IX. Attorneys 
-• RULE 74. WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
(a) An attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court and serving on all parties a notice of with-
drawal. The notice of withdrawal shall include the address of the attorney's client and a statement that no motion is 
pending and no hearing or trial has been set. If a motion is pending or a hearing or trial has been set, an attorney may 
not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. The motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of any 
pending motion and the date and purpose of any scheduled hearing or trial. 
(b) An attorney who has entered a limited appearance under Rule 75 shall withdraw from the case by filing and 
serving a notice of withdrawal upon the conclusion of the purpose or proceeding identified in the Notice of Limited 
Appearance. An attorney who seeks to withdraw before the conclusion of the purpose or proceeding shall proceed 
under subdivision (a). 
(c) If an attorney withdraws other than under subdivision (b), dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is dis-
barred, or is removed from the case by the court, the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel on the unrepresented party, informing the party of the responsibility to appear personally or appoint coun-
sel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be 
held in the case until 20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party 
waives the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
(d) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the counsel of record by filing and serving a notice of substi-
tution of counsel signed by former counsel, new counsel and the client. Court approval is not required if new coun-
sel certifies in the notice of substitution that counsel will comply with the existing hearing schedule and deadlines. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Adopted effective November 1, 2003; amended effective April 1,2004; November 1, 2006; April 1, 2007.] 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
This rule replaces former Rule 4-506 repealed effective November 1, 2003. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Attorney and Client € ^ 7 6 ( 1 ) , 76(2), 75. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 45k76(l); 45k76(2); 45k75. 
CJ.S. Attorney and Client §§ 58, 218 to 225, 227. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
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In general I 
L In general 
Plaintiff was not entitled to relief from summary judgment on grounds that defendant was required to serve a notice 
to appear or appoint counsel, after plaintiffs attorney withdrew from representing plaintiff; attorney was not permit-
ted to withdraw without court permission while summary judgment motion was pending, and attorney did not obtain 
court permission to withdraw. Hawlev v. Union Pacific R.R., Co., 2005, 2005 UT App 368,2005 WL 2099788, Un-
reported. Judgment € ^ 3 5 9 
Former husband, who moved to set aside confession of judgment which he had entered into while unrepresented, 
subsequent to withdrawal of his counsel in ongoing divorce proceedings, as to distribution of proceeds from sale of 
marital property, waived compliance with rule requiring opposing party, upon withdrawal of formerly represented 
party's counsel, to serve formal notice on now unrepresented party, twenty days before further proceedings in the 
case, of unrepresented party's responsibility to retain another attorney or to appear in person, where rule expressly 
made time requirement subject to waiver, counsel for former husband reappeared on his behalf post-withdrawal and 
failed to object based on noncompliance with the rule to default judgment obtained in show cause hearing on con-
fession of judgment, and former husband failed to raise the issue when he objected to former wife's writ of garnish-
ment. Migliore v. Migliore, 2008, 186 P.3d 973, 605 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 2008 UT App 208. Divorce €^>254(2) 
Rules Civ. Proa, Rule 74, UT R RCP Rule 74 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2009. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt. 
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